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INTRODUCTION
From the European refugee crisis to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi to China’s treatment of the Uighurs of Xinjiang to the fate of the Venezuelan 
regime, Turkey has significantly increased its presence 
in international politics in the last decade and sought to 
extend its global outreach. With rising populism at home 
and the Syrian civil war at its borders, Turkey and its 
relations with the world are more in need of analysis than 
ever before. 
As the international system is going through a major 
transformation, with the balance of power rapidly shifting 
towards the “rest”, many observers have begun discussing 
multipolarity as the defining characteristic of a new world 
(dis)order, questioning whether emerging economies will 
challenge or uphold the existing liberal order. Most of the 
academic debate tends to revolve around the implications 
of the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) for the future of the international system while 
smaller emerging powers such as Turkey get much less 
attention. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkish decision 
makers have advocated the idea that Turkey should play 
a pivotal role in a newly forming world order and scholars 
have increasingly portrayed Turkey as a “middle power” 
along the lines of Brazil and India emphasising Turkey’s 
ambitions to shape global politics.
In this report, I discuss Turkey’s engagement with 
international politics through the lens of the concept of 
“middle power”, questioning whether and how Turkey 
fits into the international system as an “emerging middle 
power”. I argue that although the Turkish government has 
been able to identify niche areas in global governance, 
domestic challenges such as setbacks in democratisation 
and economic performance have limited Turkey’s soft 
power capabilities. 
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IDENTIfyINg ThE ChaRaCTERISTICS Of 
mIDDlE pOWER fOREIgN pOlICy 
There is contentious debate in International Relations 
(IR) on what a “middle power” is and whether the term 
is useful at all to categorise and differentiate between 
states with varying degrees of capabilities and resources. 
Broadly speaking, a middle power is a state that is 
neither a great nor a small power. However, a particular 
problem with this definition is that there is a wide set 
of states which can potentially qualify for the middle-
ranking category making it difficult to provide an entirely 
satisfactory description of what a neither-great-nor-small 
power looks like.  
The idea of hierarchically classifying states in terms of 
their relative power has been around for centuries and 
featured most famously in the Italian political philosopher 
Botero’s 16th century description of the European 
state system as consisting of three types of powers: 
grandissime, mezano and piccioli. In mainstream IR, it 
became popular in the mid-20th century with Organski’s 
power transition theory (1958), which postulated a power 
hierarchy formed of dominant, great, middle, and small 
powers. Organski’s typology recognised the middle 
power grouping as consisting of states which are able 
to exert influence on a regional, and to some degree, 
global scale, though his analysis tended to treat states 
in this category as peripheral actors and focused rather 
on the predominance of greater powers in world politics 
(Cooper, 2011: 318). According to Cooper, Higgott and 
Nossal (1993: 17), such a structural definition based 
on the position of middle powers in the international 
hierarchy “has its problems, particularly its dependence 
on quantifiable measures of power, but it does satisfy 
the intuitive desire to differentiate between those states 
which are clearly not great powers but are not minor 
powers either”.     
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In the literature, illustrative archetypes 
of middle powers traditionally included 
Canada and Australia as well as the Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden) and the Netherlands. 
These states are typically described 
as guardians of the global balance of 
power protecting peace and order in the 
international system (Holbraad, 1984: 
205). They are widely accepted to be 
bridge-builders, striving to link up different 
clusters of states built around certain 
interests and ideas, and consensus-
seeking interlocutors who “pursue 
multilateral solutions to international 
problems” and embrace “notions of ‘good 
international citizenship’ to guide their 
diplomacy” (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal, 
1993: 19). India under Nehru’s leadership, 
for example, engaged in this kind of inter-
bloc diplomacy and played an important 
role in the Non-Aligned Movement trying to 
defuse tension between dominant powers 
during the Cold War. Middle powers 
practice “niche diplomacy” concentrating 
their energy and resources in specific 
issue areas likely to yield the most 
results as they have limited resources for 
pursuing a grand global strategy (ibid.: 
19, 145). The Norwegians, for instance, 
have assumed the role of mediator in 
complex international conflicts and are 
heavily invested in the idea of using their 
Scandinavian identity as a neutral country 
to pursue peace-making diplomacy. 
Recent literature differentiates between 
traditional and emerging middle powers 
(Jordaan, 2003, 2017). Traditional middle 
powers are understood to be wealthy, 
stable, and egalitarian social democracies 
and promoters of a liberal international 
order. Emerging middle powers, on the 
other hand, are often states that have 
assumed internationalist postures after 
the post-Cold War and in many cases 
have a lower quality of development and 
democratisation experiences. Furthermore, 
emerging middle powers tend to have 
semi-peripheral roles in the global 
economy coupled with significant income 
inequality in the domestic arena. They 
often approach global governance with 
structural concerns about the international 
power hierarchy (Alden and Vieira, 2005: 
1081) and they can be hesitant to promote 
liberal internationalism. As Öniş and Kutlay 
(2017: 2) put it, they face “a dilemma 
that they are both critical of the existing 
liberal order dominated by the established 
Western powers and, at the same time, 
have an incentive to be a part of an 
international order based on liberal norms”. 
Turkey is a good example of a state 
which has faced this dilemma: Turkish 
decision makers have often criticised the 
Western-dominated international order, 
especially for structural inequalities, but at 
the same time recognised the incentives 
of having a greater say in the same order. 
Successive Turkish governments have 
criticised decision-making processes in 
international institutions, for example 
the UN for failing to take effective steps 
to bring peace to Israel-Palestine (e.g., 
Erdoğan, 2018d). President Erdoğan’s 
slogan “The World Is Bigger than Five” – 
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referring to the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council with veto rights – encapsulates the Turkish 
government’s critique of the existing international 
system and, in the words of Erdoğan (2018c), this 
motto is “the biggest-ever rise against global injustice” 
and exploitation of the world economy. However, 
while voicing criticism of the existing order, as Kirişçi 
and Bülbül (2018) observed, Turkey has benefited 
greatly from participating in the liberal international 
system since “[m]embership to NATO, the G-20, the 
World Trade Organization, and other connections with 
the trans-Atlantic alliance became key components 
of Turkey’s rising soft power in the early 2000s”. 
Furthermore, in his speech at the 73rd session of the 
UN General Assembly and in an op-ed in Foreign Policy, 
Erdoğan himself defended multilateralism and free 
trade and even criticised the Trump administration for 
undermining the liberal international order (Erdoğan, 
2018b, 2018a).   
ThE CaSE Of TURKEy
Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have discussed 
Turkey’s ambition to expand its area of influence in 
its neighbourhood and the middle power concept has 
been widely used to describe Turkey’s engagement 
with the international system (e.g., Müftüler and Yüksel, 
1997; see also Hale, 1992). For example, Hale (2013: 
1) argues that using the term middle power is the most 
realistic way of conceptualising Turkey’s international 
role to explain Turkish policies, defining power as 
“the ability to oblige other states to take actions that 
they would not otherwise have taken and to resist 
pressure to do so from other states”. In the Turkish 
case, this means that while Turkey is not a great power, 
it has considerable ability to act independently, resist 
pressure from great powers, and exert influence as a 
regional actor. 
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Turkish foreign policy over the last decade has shown 
behavioural characteristics of an emerging middle power 
in a number of ways. First, as Jordaan (2003: 172-73; 
2017: 404) points out, one of the common features of 
emerging middle powers is that they are “eager, and often 
leading, participants in regional structures” and frequently 
identified as regional powers. A main objective of Turkish 
foreign policy in the Justice and Development Party 
(“AKP”) period has been to position Turkey as a regional 
power and to increase Turkey’s presence in regional as 
well as global initiatives. To this end, Turkish decision 
makers attempted to improve Turkey’s relations with 
Middle Eastern states with Muslim-majority populations, 
established closer ties with regional organisations such 
as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and 
strove to generate soft power using Turkey’s history and 
identity. This policy was particularly successful in the 
early 2000s, especially when the Turkish government 
was able to boost Turkey’s image as a role model for the 
Muslim world; however, it then faced significant setbacks 
with a decline in the AKP’s performance in terms of 
economic development and democratisation (Öniş and 
Kutlay, 2017: 8-15; Kuru, 2015). 
Second, emerging middle powers tend to exhibit status-
seeking behaviour. That is to say, they pursue enhanced 
international standing and aim to climb the ranks of 
the global power hierarchy (Chapnick, 1999: 76; Karim, 
2018; Wood, 1988: 19-20; Larson and Shevchenko, 2014). 
As Wohlforth, et al. (2017: 528) highlight, “status is 
intrinsically coupled with the concept of recognition”. One 
of the main aspirations of Turkey is to be recognised as 
a global actor, or as a “pivotal state” as Davutoğlu (2001: 
91) termed. Becoming a middle power and a regional 
leader has been seen by Turkish decision makers as a 
natural step on the way to this goal (Sandal, 2014: 702). 
Similar tendencies are present in other emerging states, 
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’
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for example Brazil has pursued policies to 
become first a regional and then a world 
power (Sandal, 2014: 702; Larson and 
Shevchenko, 2019: 4, 12).
Third, Turkish foreign policy makers have 
attempted to practice niche diplomacy 
using Turkey’s unique geographical and 
cultural position between the East and 
the West and presenting themselves as 
bridge-builders. Davutoğlu, for example, 
often emphasised that Turkey has access 
to both the global north and south, and 
he identified mediation and humanitarian 
diplomacy as the key components in 
gaining Turkey a greater say in global 
governance (Davutoğlu, 2013a, 2013b). 
Turkey sought to build coalitions with other 
middle powers and most notably took part 
in MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Turkey, and Australia), a cross-regional 
consultative forum which aims to “play 
a bridging role between developed and 
developing countries to promote global 
governance and complement the efforts of 
regionalism” (MIKTA, 2015; see also Gök 
and Karadeniz, 2018). 
As Wohlforth, et al. (2017: 533) argue, 
one of the strategies middle powers use 
to seek status is formulating policies 
which will allow them to be perceived 
as a “good power” with foreign policies 
that have a moral dimension. Turkey is a 
good example in the sense that Turkish 
decision makers have tried to develop the 
moral dimension of Turkish foreign policy 
investing in Turkey’s image as a mediator 
and a humanitarian power.
Accordingly, Turkey assumed the role of 
a mediator in a number of international 
conflicts, mostly in its immediate 
neighbourhood, and was an eager 
participant in multilateral initiatives on 
peace making. Most notably, it launched 
indirect peace talks between Israel and 
Syria in 2008 (Davutoğlu, 2013b: 85), 
negotiated a nuclear deal with Iran in 
2010 working in collaboration with Brazil 
(Barrionuevo and Arsu, 2010), and set up 
the Group of Friends of Mediation under 
the UN framework in 2010 in a joint effort 
with Finland for peaceful settlement 
of disputes and conflict prevention 
(Davutoğlu and Tuomioja, 2012). 
Moreover, the Turkish government helped 
establish informal dialogue between 
various political groups in Middle Eastern 
conflicts and presented itself as a valuable 
asset to the international community 
because of its networks in the region. 
For example, in the beginning of the 
Syrian uprising in 2011, Turkey bilaterally 
approached the Syrian government in 
order to call for de-escalation of violence, 
played an active role in the Friends of 
Syria Group with an aim to establish an 
international consensus for the solution 
to the conflict, and facilitated informal 
talks between the international community 
and various actors involved in the conflict 
(Süsler, 2016: 227-30, 42-45). The EU, for 
instance, recognised Turkey as a valuable 
strategic partner during the course of 
the Syrian uprising because of Turkey’s 
expertise in the region. As the advisor on 
Turkey to the EU High Representative at 
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the time commented, Turkey had “niche 
connections” with regional actors that the 
EU did not and this was instrumental in 
terms of communication with the Syrian 
opposition. When Turkey hosted the Syrian 
opposition, for instance, the EU used 
Turkey to pass its messages, such as its 
calls to the opposition to be more inclusive 
(ibid.: 351).
Turkish foreign policy decision makers 
also concentrated their efforts to develop 
what they called Turkey’s “humanitarian 
diplomacy”, increasing Turkey’s assistance 
to developing nations and responding 
to major humanitarian crises around 
the world (Davutoğlu, 2013a; Çavuşoğlu, 
2016). Turkey eagerly took part in 
international initiatives to discuss the 
global humanitarian system. For example, 
it hosted the first-ever World Humanitarian 
Summit in 2016 and promoted its image 
as a humanitarian actor in international 
forums, underlining that it hosts the largest 
refugee population in the world which 
includes more than 3.5 million Syrian 
refugees (Hürriyet Daily News,  
2018, 2016).
The Turkish government emphasised  
the humanitarian dimension of Turkish 
foreign policy when engaging with the 
developing world. For example, as  
Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu (2016) 
explained, “[h]umanitarian diplomacy is 
one of the main components of Turkey’s 
approach towards Africa”. Scholars have 
highlighted Turkey’s transformation from 
an aid recipient to an aid donor country 
and characterised Turkey as a “new 
humanitarian power” (Ali, 2011; see also 
Özkan, 2013b; Özkan, 2013a; Habiyaremye 
and Oğuzlu, 2014). The government 
complemented its “humanitarian 
diplomacy” with a policy aimed to increase 
trade and cultural exchanges with African 
nations. As a result, Ankara’s approach 
gained Turkey considerable soft power 
and was welcomed particularly by African 
governments which depended on Turkish 
aid the most.  
The middle power concept provides a 
useful analytical framework especially 
in light of these tendencies in Turkish 
foreign policy in recent years and helps 
explain Turkey’s engagement with the 
international system as well as the policies 
it has pursued to increase its international 
standing. However, one should also 
note that successful middle powers are 
influencers, not only regionally but also 
globally, and they possess an ability to 
shape the international agenda. In this 
respect, even though Turkey has shown 
political willingness to play a middle power 
role, its middle power capabilities are 
considerably limited in terms of its global 
reach and ability to shape the direction of 
international politics. 
As Öniş and Kutlay (2017: 3) stress, to 
conduct effective foreign policy, emerging 
middle powers need to have “the ability 
to serve as role models based on their 
soft-power resources – i.e. the quality 
of their developmental and democratic 
credentials”. In this regard, major domestic 
setbacks Turkey has faced in recent years, 
including a decline in democratisation 
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and economic performance, have limited Turkey’s 
attractiveness on the global stage and constrained 
the abilities of Turkish foreign policy to exercise soft 
power to shape politics beyond its borders (see e.g., 
Kuru, 2015). The weakening of the Turkish Lira, coupled 
with the consolidation of power by the government, has 
diminished Turkey’s middle power image along with its 
capacity to serve as a role model. This is in contrast 
with the pre-Arab Spring Turkish foreign policy when 
Turkey boosted its soft power in its neighbourhood 
and when there was a debate in popular and academic 
circles in the Western world on whether Middle Eastern 
states could follow the “Turkish model” and whether 
Turkey’s experience with democratisation and economic 
development may have a demonstration effect on the 
other countries in the region (e.g., Ülgen, 2011;  
Taşpınar, 2012). 
The term “emerging middle power” signifies recognition 
of a state’s capabilities as well as limitations, and the 
success of states in this grouping in terms making 
constructive impact on global governance tend to be 
dependent upon their ability to avoid a “mismatch of 
expectations and capabilities” (Öniş and Kutlay, 2017: 
16-17). The case of Turkey is a good example in the 
sense that the foreign policy rhetoric used in Ankara has 
not always matched Turkey’s capabilities. For example, 
when the Arab Spring began, the Turkish government 
had the ambition to be recognised as an order-setting 
power in the Middle East which led to Turkey’s increasing 
involvement in Arab Spring conflicts (ibid.:13). However, 
the government faced significant challenges in terms 
of influencing the politics of the region in line with its 
interests. For example, it was unable to achieve its goal of 
regime change in Syria, its closest ally Egyptian president 
Morsi was no longer in power, and it had diplomatic 
crises with the military regime in Egypt leading the 
Turkish ambassador in Cairo to be declared persona non 
grata in 2013 (see e.g., Kuru, 2015).  
‘The foreign 
policy rhetoric 
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’
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CONClUSION
Turkey’s ambitions to increase its international standing in 
the post-Cold War era and willingness to play a greater role in 
regional and global governance have attracted considerable 
academic attention. The concept of an “emerging middle 
power” in the literature provides a useful analytical 
framework for explaining various aspects of Turkish foreign 
policy behaviour and the way in which Turkish decision 
makers have sought to position Turkey as a global actor. 
Turkish foreign policy has shown the behavioural 
characteristics of an “emerging middle power” in a number 
of ways. Specifically, Turkey played an eager role in regional 
and global initiatives, such as MIKTA, presented itself as a 
mediator and a bridge-builder using its unique identity, and 
emphasised humanitarian diplomacy as a fundamental 
aspect of its foreign policy approach.   
However, although Turkey has showed a willingness to play 
a middle power role, its ability to shape the international 
agenda has been considerably limited. In the domestic  
arena, setbacks in democratisation and economic 
development have limited Turkey’s soft power  
capabilities and attractiveness in the eyes of regional  
and international actors. 
Repairing relations with Western allies, focusing on reforms 
that can provide long-term economic stability, and making 
progress on the democratisation front can not only boost 
Turkey’s soft power but also develop Turkey’s ability to play a 
bridge-builder role in global governance. 
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